

# Cost and Technical Efficiency of German Hospitals

## Does Ownership Matter?

Annika Herr

Ruhr Graduate School in Economics

and

Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

This is a presentation of an article published in Health Economics 17(9): 1057-1071, 2008.

Infraday 2008

# The German Health Care System in 2003

## The System

- System of cost reimbursement (Introduction of capitation fees (DRG system) in 2004)

# The German Health Care System in 2003

## The System

- System of cost reimbursement (Introduction of capitation fees (DRG system) in 2004)
- 50% increase in per capita costs since 1993

# The German Health Care System in 2003

## The System


- System of cost reimbursement (Introduction of capitation fees (DRG system) in 2004)
- 50% increase in per capita costs since 1993
- €235 billion spent on health care in 2003 (11.1% of German GDP)

# The German Health Care System in 2003

## The System

- System of cost reimbursement (Introduction of capitation fees (DRG system) in 2004)
- 50% increase in per capita costs since 1993
- €235 billion spent on health care in 2003 (11.1% of German GDP)
- 30% spent on hospitals

# Unweighted average length of stay by ownership type and year



own calculations, final sample

# Outline

1 Literature overview

2 Methodology

3 The dataset

4 Results

5 Conclusion

# Outline

1 Literature overview

2 Methodology

3 The dataset

4 Results

5 Conclusion



# Literature overview: Hospital efficiency studies

Author	Country	Method	Least efficient type
Helmig & Lapsley (2001)	Germany	DEA	Private
Werblow & Robra (2006)	Germany	DEA	Public
Staat (2006)	Germany	DEA	no significant diff.
Schreyögg & Tiemann (2008)	Germany	DEA	Private
Hollingworth (2003)	mainly US	DEA	mainly Private (for-profit)
Zuckerman & Hadley (1994)	USA	Half-normal	Private (for-profit)
Folland & Hofler (2001)	USA	Half-normal	Private (for-profit)
Farsi & Filippini (2006, 2008)	SW	2 step, trunc.	no significant diff.
Rosko (1999)	USA	2 step	Private (for-profit)
Rosko (2001, 2004)	USA	Truncated	Private (for-profit)
Brown (2003)	USA	Truncated	Private (for-profit)

The base group varies between only non-profit, only public and non-profit and public hospitals.

# Outline

1 Literature overview

**2 Methodology**


3 The dataset

4 Results


5 Conclusion

# Graphical depiction of DEA and SFA

## Data Envelopment Analysis



## Stochastic Frontier Analysis



2 inputs,  $x_1, x_2$ , to produce 1 unit of output  $y$

$A, B, C, D$ : observed input combinations

$A', B', C', D'$ : frontier input combinations (inefficiency  $u_i = 0$ )

inefficiency: distance between o and x or between  $A'$  and  $A$ , etc.

noise: distance between o and frontier

# Estimation strategy

- Assume Cobb Douglas (and translog) production function

# Estimation strategy

- Assume Cobb Douglas (and translog) production function
- Weight cases of each diagnosis with respect to its average length of stay

# Estimation strategy

- Assume Cobb Douglas (and translog) production function
- Weight cases of each diagnosis with respect to its average length of stay
- Assume random noise to be normally distributed

# Estimation strategy

- Assume Cobb Douglas (and translog) production function
- Weight cases of each diagnosis with respect to its average length of stay
- Assume random noise to be normally distributed
- Assume inefficiency to be truncated-normally distributed and to depend on exogenous variables such as ownership type, region, and patients' characteristics (half-normal distribution can be rejected)

# Estimation strategy

- Assume Cobb Douglas (and translog) production function
- Weight cases of each diagnosis with respect to its average length of stay
- Assume random noise to be normally distributed
- Assume inefficiency to be truncated-normally distributed and to depend on exogenous variables such as ownership type, region, and patients' characteristics (half-normal distribution can be rejected)
- Estimate both technical (output: number of weighted cases) and cost efficiency (output: total adjusted costs)



# Estimation strategy

- Assume Cobb Douglas (and translog) production function
- Weight cases of each diagnosis with respect to its average length of stay
- Assume random noise to be normally distributed
- Assume inefficiency to be truncated-normally distributed and to depend on exogenous variables such as ownership type, region, and patients' characteristics (half-normal distribution can be rejected)
- Estimate both technical (output: number of weighted cases) and cost efficiency (output: total adjusted costs)
- Estimate models for each year separately as well as for all three years (Battese & Coelli, 1997)

# Estimation strategy

- Assume Cobb Douglas (and translog) production function
- Weight cases of each diagnosis with respect to its average length of stay
- Assume random noise to be normally distributed
- Assume inefficiency to be truncated-normally distributed and to depend on exogenous variables such as ownership type, region, and patients' characteristics (half-normal distribution can be rejected)
- Estimate both technical (output: number of weighted cases) and cost efficiency (output: total adjusted costs)
- Estimate models for each year separately as well as for all three years (Battese & Coelli, 1997)
- Predict expected efficiency conditional on the estimated composite error (inconsistent with cross sectional data)

# SFA

Cobb-Douglas production function assumed

Log-linear **production model**

$$\ln y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_n \beta_n \ln x_{ni} + \underbrace{v_i - u_i}_{\epsilon_i},$$

where  $y_i$  is a single output,  $x_i = [x_{1i}, \dots, x_{Ni}]'$  is the vector of inputs,  $v_i$  is random noise and  $\beta = [\beta_1, \dots, \beta_N]'$  is the vector of parameters to estimate.  $u_i \geq 0$  is the output decreasing inefficiency.

# SFA

Cobb-Douglas production function assumed

Log-linear **production model**

$$\ln y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_n \beta_n \ln x_{ni} + \underbrace{v_i - u_i}_{\epsilon_i}$$

where  $y_i$  is a single output,  $x_i = [x_{1i}, \dots, x_{Ni}]'$  is the vector of inputs,  $v_i$  is random noise and  $\beta = [\beta_1, \dots, \beta_N]'$  is the vector of parameters to estimate.  $u_i \geq 0$  is the output decreasing inefficiency.

Distributional assumptions

$$v_i \sim N[0, \sigma_v^2],$$

$$u_i \sim N^+[z_i' \delta, \sigma_u^2],$$

$u_i$  and  $v_i$  are independent of each other and of the regressors.

# SFA

Cobb-Douglas production function assumed

Log-linear **production model**

$$\ln y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_n \beta_n \ln x_{ni} + \underbrace{v_i - u_i}_{\epsilon_i}$$

where  $y_i$  is a single output,  $x_i = [x_{1i}, \dots, x_{Ni}]'$  is the vector of inputs,  $v_i$  is random noise and  $\beta = [\beta_1, \dots, \beta_N]'$  is the vector of parameters to estimate.  $u_i \geq 0$  is the output decreasing inefficiency.

Distributional assumptions

$$v_i \sim N[0, \sigma_v^2],$$

$$u_i \sim N^+[z_i' \delta, \sigma_u^2],$$

$u_i$  and  $v_i$  are independent of each other and of the regressors.

firm-specific (time variant) variables  $z_i = [z_{1i}, \dots, z_{Ki}]'$  account for heterogeneity of the hospitals

# Technical and Cost Frontier

Technical frontier:

- dependent variable

# Technical and Cost Frontier

Technical frontier:

- dependent variable  
weighted number of cases

# Technical and Cost Frontier

Technical frontier:

- dependent variable
  - weighted number of cases
- independent variables
  - number of doctors
  - number of nursery staff
  - number of other staff
  - number of installed beds



# Technical and Cost Frontier

Technical frontier:

- dependent variable
  - weighted number of cases
- independent variables
  - number of doctors
  - number of nursery staff
  - number of other staff
  - number of installed beds

Cost frontier:

- dependent variable

# Technical and Cost Frontier

Technical frontier:

- dependent variable
  - weighted number of cases
- independent variables
  - number of doctors
  - number of nursery staff
  - number of other staff
  - number of installed beds

Cost frontier:

- dependent variable
  - total adjusted costs

# Technical and Cost Frontier

## Technical frontier:

- dependent variable
  - weighted number of cases
- independent variables
  - number of doctors
  - number of nursery staff
  - number of other staff
  - number of installed beds

## Cost frontier:

- dependent variable
  - total adjusted costs
- independent variables
  - costs per doctor
  - costs per nurse (used for normalisation)
  - costs per other staff
  - medical requirements per bed
  - weighted number of cases as output variable

## Exogenous influences on inefficiency: $Z_i$

- ownership type dummies
- non-subsidised dummy:  
interacted with each ownership type and lagged by one year
- east dummy
- female ratio
- ratio of older than 75 years
- ratio of surgeries
- (occupancy rate:  $occ\_ratio = days / (beds \cdot 365)$ )
- (nurse per bed ratio)
- (death ratio)

Not feasible in hospital statistics

- ratio of privately insured patients
- quality other than death ratio

# Outline

1 Literature overview

2 Methodology

**3 The dataset**

4 Results

5 Conclusion

# The hospital statistics

- full set of German hospitals, 1,800 general hospitals
- full set of patient data (17 mio treatments per year) aggregated on diagnosis level (830,000-930,000 observations per year)
- patients statistic contains: age, sex, death, main diagnosis (ICD 9, 3 digits), length of stay (los)
- information about los of each diagnosis treated in each hospital enables construction of case-mix weights

## Descriptive Statistics: Mean values in 2003 and sign of change to 2000

variable	Public		Non-profit		Private	
	2003	03/00	2003	03/00	2003	03/00
<i>exogenous variables</i>						
no_subsidies	0.02	--	0.01	--	0.27	-
east	0.17	0	0.14	0	0.26	0
female_ratio	0.55	-	0.57	-	0.56	0
plus75_ratio	0.21	++	0.23	+	0.17	++
surgery_ratio	0.45	+++	0.42	+++	0.44	++
<i>other figures of interest</i>						
beds	345.85	-	264.68	-	164.58	-
occupancy_rate	0.76	-	0.75	-	0.73	-
nurse/bed	0.56	-	0.54	-	0.49	+
av. length of stay	8.57	--	9.53	--	10.09	--
total_adj_costs/bed [in 1000€]	96.44		90.21		93.67	
total_adj_costs/case	2,930		3,160		3,158	
Sample size N	641	-	693	-	260	++

**Table:** The Hospital Statistics: Mean values of the year 2003 and hospital specific changes to 2000 (the latter includes all hospitals having been observed in both years), where +: below 10%, ++: below 20%, +++: below 30%, ++++: below 40%.

## Descriptive Statistics: Mean values in 2003 and sign of change to 2000

variable	Public		Non-profit		Private	
	2003	03/00	2003	03/00	2003	03/00
<i>exogenous variables</i>						
no_subsidies	0.02	--	0.01	--	0.27	-
east	0.17	0	0.14	0	0.26	0
female_ratio	0.55	-	0.57	-	0.56	0
plus75_ratio	0.21	++	0.23	+	0.17	++
surgery_ratio	0.45	+++	0.42	+++	0.44	++
<i>other figures of interest</i>						
beds	345.85	-	264.68	-	164.58	-
occupancy_rate	<b>0.76</b>	-	<b>0.75</b>	-	<b>0.73</b>	-
nurse/bed	0.56	-	0.54	-	0.49	+
av. length of stay	<b>8.57</b>	--	<b>9.53</b>	--	<b>10.09</b>	--
total_adj_costs/bed [in 1000€]	96.44		90.21		93.67	
total_adj_costs/case	<b>2,930</b>		<b>3,160</b>		<b>3,158</b>	
Sample size N	641	-	693	-	260	++

**Table:** The Hospital Statistics: Mean values of the year 2003 and hospital specific changes to 2000 (the latter includes all hospitals having been observed in both years), where +: below 10%, ++: below 20%, +++: below 30%, ++++: below 40%.



# Outline

1 Literature overview

2 Methodology

3 The dataset

**4 Results**

5 Conclusion

# Results Cost Efficiency

In adjusted_costs	2001	2002	2003
frontier estimates			
In price_docs	0.08 **	0.13 ***	0.08 **
In price_other_staff	0.32 ***	0.30 ***	0.34 ***
In price_bed	0.22 ***	0.28 ***	0.24 ***
In weighted cases	1.02 ***	0.98 ***	1.00 ***
constant	-2.83 ***	-2.47 ***	-2.64 ***
effects on inefficiency			
private	2.02 ***	2.16 **	2.14 **
nonprofit	1.09 **	0.96 *	1.23 *
(no_subs × private) <sub>t-1</sub>	1.89 ***	2.73 ***	2.81 **
(no_subs × nonprofit) <sub>t-1</sub>	2.66 ***	4.28 ***	3.60 **
(no_subs × public) <sub>t-1</sub>	3.47 ***	3.64 **	3.48 **
east	0.69 **	0.66	0.44
plus75 ratio	1.33	3.83 **	3.36 **
surgery ratio	-2.68 ***	-3.31 **	-2.03 **
female ratio	-4.50 ***	-4.50 **	-5.32 **
constant	-1.08	-2.58 *	-2.46
Log likelihood	234	236	259
Obs.	1,556	1,549	1,565

**Table:** Significance level: \*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$ . Price for nursing staff used for normalisation of prices and costs.

# Results Technical Efficiency

In weighted cases	2001	2002	2003
effects on inefficiency			
private	3.18 ***	2.88 **	2.88 *
nonprofit	2.14 **	1.82 **	1.95 *
(no_subs × private) <sub>t-1</sub>	1.57 ***	2.74 ***	2.29 **
(no_subs × nonprofit) <sub>t-1</sub>	2.36 ***	3.59 **	3.05 **
(no_subs × public) <sub>t-1</sub>	4.41 ***	4.34 **	4.23 *
east	0.00	-0.58	-1.40 *
plus75 ratio	1.31	3.97 **	3.35 **
surgery ratio	-3.49 ***	-3.34 **	-2.38 **
female ratio	-2.12 **	-1.92	-1.47
constant	-3.18 **	-4.67 **	-4.71 *
Log likelihood	508	482	519
Obs.	1,556	1,549	1,565

**Table:** Significance level: \*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$ .

# Panel Data Analysis



	CE, 2002-2003		TE, 2001-2003	
	Translog	Cobb-Douglas	Translog	Cobb-Douglas
ln adjusted_costs				
frontier estimates +const	16 coeff.	6 coeff.	17 coeff.	7 coeff.
year 2002 dummy (technology)			0.013 ** (0.005)	0.012 ** (0.006)
year 2003 dummy (technology)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.011 * (0.006)	0.011 * (0.006)
<b>effects on inefficiency</b>				
private	1.709 *** (0.071)	1.342 *** (0.137)	2.063 *** (0.094)	1.909 *** (0.048)
nonprofit	1.145 *** (0.045)	0.682 *** (0.079)	1.205 *** (0.049)	1.169 *** (0.034)
(no_subs×private) <sub>t-1</sub>	1.660 *** (0.109)	1.586 *** (0.125)	1.454 *** (0.092)	1.325 *** (0.045)
(no_subs×nonprofit) <sub>t-1</sub>	3.144 *** (0.155)	2.777 *** (0.244)	2.344 *** (0.115)	2.049 *** (0.106)
(no_subs×public) <sub>t-1</sub>	2.476 *** (0.145)	2.221 *** (0.210)	3.226 *** (0.154)	2.980 *** (0.100)
east	0.488 *** (0.033)	0.455 *** (0.058)	-0.258 *** (0.050)	-0.326 *** (0.031)
plus75 ratio	2.600 *** (0.106)	3.314 *** (0.327)	2.192 *** (0.080)	2.292 *** (0.146)
surgery ratio	-2.084 *** (0.064)	-1.692 *** (0.171)	-2.120 *** (0.078)	-2.181 *** (0.046)
female ratio	-3.059 *** (0.164)	-3.867 *** (0.325)	-1.341 *** (0.100)	-1.178 *** (0.148)
death rate		-5.594 *** (1.367)		-2.610 *** (0.652)
year 2002 dummy (inefficiency)			-0.095 ** (0.040)	-0.129 *** (0.037)
year 2003 dummy (inefficiency)	-0.044 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.032)	-0.138 *** (0.030)	-0.151 *** (0.026)
constant	-2.477 *** (0.279)	-0.768 *** (0.188)	-2.519 *** (0.185)	-2.346 *** (0.126)
Obs.	3,010	3,010	4,329	4,329

Balanced panel. Standard errors in parentheses. Costs are deflated to year 2000 prices.

Navigation icons: back, forward, search, etc.

# Efficiency scores

**Figure:** Mean values of technical (a) and cost (b) efficiency scores by ownership type and year



Bootstrapping scores, 500 repetitions: F-test reveals that scores differ significantly between ownership types

# Robustness Checks

Changing different assumptions does not change the main findings:

- Sample selection: only subsidised hospitals, no trimming

# Robustness Checks

Changing different assumptions does not change the main findings:

- Sample selection: only subsidised hospitals, no trimming
- Specification: include death ratio, occupancy ratio and nurse per bed ratio

# Robustness Checks

Changing different assumptions does not change the main findings:

- Sample selection: only subsidised hospitals, no trimming
- Specification: include death ratio, occupancy ratio and nurse per bed ratio
- Distributional assumptions: Estimate half-normal model, true fixed effects, two step, Fixed Effects, OLS



# Robustness Checks

Changing different assumptions does not change the main findings:

- Sample selection: only subsidised hospitals, no trimming
- Specification: include death ratio, occupancy ratio and nurse per bed ratio
- Distributional assumptions: Estimate half-normal model, true fixed effects, two step, Fixed Effects, OLS
- Pooled truncated normal one-step approach by Battese & Coelli (1995), technological change, change in efficiency

# Robustness Checks

Changing different assumptions does not change the main findings:

- Sample selection: only subsidised hospitals, no trimming
- Specification: include death ratio, occupancy ratio and nurse per bed ratio
- Distributional assumptions: Estimate half-normal model, true fixed effects, two step, Fixed Effects, OLS
- Pooled truncated normal one-step approach by Battese & Coelli (1995), technological change, change in efficiency
- Translog production (panel: both models, cross section: only technical efficiency)

# Pairwise correlation coefficients of efficiency rankings in 2001 across different models

Pairwise correlation	Technical Efficiency models				Cost Efficiency Models			
	TE exponential	TE half-normal w/o $z_i$	TE half-normal with $z_i$	TE truncated	CE exponential	CE half-normal w/o $z_i$	CE half-normal with $z_i$	CE truncated
TE exponential	1.0000							
TE half-normal w/o $z_i$	0.9419	1.0000						
TE half-normal with $z_i$	0.9909	0.9337	1.0000					
<b>TE truncated</b>	0.8913	0.9569	0.8577	1.0000				
CE exponential	0.8066	0.8247	0.8221	0.7247	1.0000			
CE half-normal w/o $z_i$	0.7175	0.8039	0.7328	0.6877	0.9647	1.0000		
CE half-normal with $z_i$	0.7655	0.7917	0.7921	0.6711	0.9906	0.9699	1.0000	
<b>CE truncated</b>	0.7849	0.8633	0.7738	0.8247	0.9423	0.9452	0.9093	1.0000
nonprofit		-0.0797		-0.1633				
Public	0.0907	0.1633	0.058*	0.3024	0.061*	0.0679		0.1688
Private	-0.1712	-0.1137	-0.1274	-0.1948	-0.1241	-0.0845	-0.0845	-0.1764
Length of stay	-0.5010	-0.5604	-0.4865	-0.5828	-0.4634	-0.4776	-0.4372	-0.5333

The highest efficiency score has the highest rank. Printed correlation coefficients are significant at a 1% level, correlation coefficients marked with \* are significant at a 5% level.

# Outline

1 Literature overview

2 Methodology

3 The dataset

4 Results

**5 Conclusion**

# Conclusion

- Private (for-profit) and non-profit ownership exhibit higher inefficiency than public ownership

# Conclusion

- Private (for-profit) and non-profit ownership exhibit higher inefficiency than public ownership
- Mixed results with respect to east-dummy

# Conclusion

- Private (for-profit) and non-profit ownership exhibit higher inefficiency than public ownership
- Mixed results with respect to east-dummy
- Technical efficiency increases over time

# Conclusion

- Private (for-profit) and non-profit ownership exhibit higher inefficiency than public ownership
- Mixed results with respect to east-dummy
- Technical efficiency increases over time
- Results in line with international studies



# Conclusion

- Private (for-profit) and non-profit ownership exhibit higher inefficiency than public ownership
- Mixed results with respect to east-dummy
- Technical efficiency increases over time
- Results in line with international studies
- Results robust with respect to distributional assumptions, specification, sample selection

# Conclusion

- Private (for-profit) and non-profit ownership exhibit higher inefficiency than public ownership
- Mixed results with respect to east-dummy
- Technical efficiency increases over time
- Results in line with international studies
- Results robust with respect to distributional assumptions, specification, sample selection
- Caveats: no good quality measure and insurance type information missing

# Conclusion

- Private (for-profit) and non-profit ownership exhibit higher inefficiency than public ownership
- Mixed results with respect to east-dummy
- Technical efficiency increases over time
- Results in line with international studies
- Results robust with respect to distributional assumptions, specification, sample selection
- Caveats: no good quality measure and insurance type information missing
- Private hospitals may have stronger incentives to keep patients longer under the cost reimbursement system in force until 2003 - do newly introduced capitation fees circumvent this behaviour?

# Finally

Thank you for your attention and your comments!

Annika Herr


Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

[annika.herr@wiso.uni-erlangen.de](mailto:annika.herr@wiso.uni-erlangen.de)

published in: Health Economics, 2008

# The German Hospital Industry

Number of German hospitals per ownership type



# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
  - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency



# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
  - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
  - ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
  - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
  - ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
  - ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
  - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
  - ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
  - ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error
  - ▶ at least one hospital is assumed to be 100% efficient

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
  - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
  - ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
  - ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error
  - ▶ at least one hospital is assumed to be 100% efficient
- 2 Parametric: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
  - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
  - ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
  - ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error
  - ▶ at least one hospital is assumed to be 100% efficient
- 2 Parametric: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
  - ▶ Maximum Likelihood estimation

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
  - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
  - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
  - ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
  - ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error
  - ▶ at least one hospital is assumed to be 100% efficient
- 2 Parametric: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
  - ▶ Maximum Likelihood estimation
  - ▶ distinction between statistical noise and inefficiency

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

## 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

- ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
- ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
- ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
- ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error
- ▶ at least one hospital is assumed to be 100% efficient

## 2 Parametric: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)

- ▶ Maximum Likelihood estimation
- ▶ distinction between statistical noise and inefficiency
- ▶ assumptions: distribution of errors, production technology, independence

# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

## 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

- ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
- ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
- ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
- ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error
- ▶ at least one hospital is assumed to be 100% efficient

## 2 Parametric: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)

- ▶ Maximum Likelihood estimation
- ▶ distinction between statistical noise and inefficiency
- ▶ assumptions: distribution of errors, production technology, independence
- ▶ hypothesis testing feasible



# Empirical methods to measure efficiency

- 1 Non-parametric: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
    - ▶ linear programming, simple to solve
    - ▶ assumption: production is deterministic, i.e. each deviation from frontier is due to inefficiency
    - ▶ multiple outputs possible, no assumption about technology
    - ▶ sensible to outliers and to measurement error
    - ▶ at least one hospital is assumed to be 100% efficient
  - 2 Parametric: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
    - ▶ Maximum Likelihood estimation
    - ▶ distinction between statistical noise and inefficiency
    - ▶ assumptions: distribution of errors, production technology, independence
    - ▶ hypothesis testing feasible
- DEA needs less assumptions but SFA is more realistic.

# Log likelihood function

Normal Truncated-normal model, Cobb Douglas production function

$$\ln L = \sum_{i=1}^I \left\{ -1/2 \ln(2\pi) - \ln \sigma - \ln \Phi(\mu/\sigma_u) - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{s\epsilon_i^j + \mu}{\sigma} \right)^2 + \ln \Phi \left( \frac{\mu}{\lambda\sigma} - s \frac{\lambda\epsilon_i^j}{\sigma} \right) \right\} \quad (1)$$

where  $s = -1, j = c$  in the case of cost efficiency and  $s = 1, j = t$  in the case of technical efficiency.

# Case-Mix-Weights

Los for each diagnosis  $m = 1, \dots, M$  over all German hospitals  $i = 1, \dots, I$ :

$$los_m = \sum_i days_{mi} / \sum_i cases_{mi}.$$

Mean length of stay over all diagnoses and hospitals:

$$los_G = \frac{1}{M} \sum_m los_m$$

which is 8.9 days in 2003.

The number of weighted cases in hospital  $i$ :

$$w\_cases_i = \sum_m \frac{los_m}{los_G} cases_{mi} = \sum_m \pi_m cases_{mi}$$

with  $\frac{1}{M} \sum_m \pi_m = 1$ .